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Web robots are automated programs that systematically browse the Web, 
collecting information. Although Web robots are valuable tools for indexing content on 
the Web, they can also be malicious through phishing, spamming, or performing targeted 
attacks. In this thesis, we study an approach to Web-robot detection that uses honeypots 
in the form of hidden resources on Web pages. Our detection model is based upon the 
observation that malicious Web robots do not consider a resource’s visibility when 
gathering information. We performed a test on an academic website and analyzed the 
honeypots’ performance using Web logs from the site’s server. Our results did detect 
Web robots, but did not adequately detect the more sophisticated robots, such as those 
using deep-crawling algorithms with query generation.  
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A Web robot is as an automated program that systematically browses the Web to 
collect information. Web robots were first developed as tools for search engines to index 
Web pages, RSS feeds, and other kinds of content on the Internet. Since their inception, 
the number and diversity of these programs crawling the Web has grown dramatically. 
Ten years ago the vast majority of traffic seen by Web servers was being generated by 
human beings [1]. Today, more than half of all traffic seen by Web servers can be 
attributed to Web robots, which are sometimes called crawlers [2].  
The rapid rise in these kinds of programs has been attributed to the explosion in 
content and user-generated social media on the Internet. The Web search engines like 
Google require large numbers of automated bots on the Web to build their indexes. 
Furthermore, the growth of internet has produced a market for businesses, both legitimate 
and otherwise, which are able to harvest data from the Web quickly and effectively. To 
keep up with this increasing demand of data mining on the Internet, modern Web 
crawlers have evolved into sophisticated, multifunctional programs that use complex 
algorithms for filtering and collecting data [3].  
Despite their large and growing numbers, Web robots still roam the Internet in an 
unregulated manner. While many provide valuable services for Internet users and content 
providers, a significant portion of bots are intended for unlawful purposes. A recent study 
[2] found that close to half of all bots are “bad,” or have been reported as abusive. In 
addition, studies have shown that traffic generated by good or bad bots, even at normal 
levels, can negatively impact a Web server’s performance [4].  
Yet even given the known problems associated with Web robots, Web-server 
administrators not generally not inclined to ban all bot traffic from their websites. It is 
difficult to distinguish between good bot traffic, malicious bot traffic, and the human 
traffic visiting a site (this aspect of bot detection is discussed in detail in Chapter II). Yet 
the “good” bots are the primary means by which a website’s content gets provided to 
search engines and other legitimate data collection sources. An outright ban of these 
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programs prevents the website from providing its content to search engines. Additionally, 
an outright ban on crawling activity can potentially lead to a server getting blacklisted by 
legitimate search engines. Legitimate search companies sometimes often associate Web 
server with crawling bans to websites hosting content that is illegitimate, illegal, or 
containing malware. For this reason and the others mentioned, there has been a push in 
research to develop tools that can detect and distinguish the bad from the benign Web 
robots.  
The bulk of the early research on Web traffic focused on the patterns and 
properties of human traffic [5]. Research in human traffic patterns helped us further 
understand how people navigate the Web, but did little to explain the behavior of Web 
robots. Web robots navigate the Web in fundamentally different ways. Humans retrieve 
information from the Web through standard interfaces like a Web browser. Web 
browsers, in turn, produce predictable sequences of resource requests, which are based 
upon a website’s design. By contrast, Web crawlers traditionally do not use a standard 
interface for resource requests to a Web server. These decisions are pre-programmed into 
and generally do not take into account the website’s design or the “human” interface 
displayed in the browser.  
Most recent studies have attempted to understand Web robot traffic through 
resource request patterns in access logs [6]. There are limitations to this method of traffic 
analysis. Modern bots possess a range of functionality and navigational strategies that are 
hard to categorize with log analysis alone. Existing research in Web crawler traffic has 
measured individual crawler variations in navigation techniques and resources used. Such 
studies for the most part have only provided a generalized picture of the differences 
between bot traffic and human traffic. 
The objective of the thesis is to evaluate the behaviors of Web robots crawling our 
university’s websites. The experiment used a combination of honeypot traps and 
statistical analysis on the University’s Web server access logs. Prior research [7] has 
demonstrated that by placing hidden resources within a Web Interface, a primitive 
honeypot can be created which reliably detects resource requests for individual crawler 
sessions. We developed and tested our own version of a Web crawler honeypot using this 
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technique. For the first part of the study, we developed a test site to create a training set 
of data to demonstrate the feasibility of our technique. We ran several well-known Web 
crawling scripts and programs on a test website. It was a duplicate of the Naval 
Postgraduate School Library website where the actual honeypot was placed for the 
second part of the study. This training set of data from the controlled test informed the 
placement location and types of resources used for the second test on the Naval 
Postgraduate School Library website.  
The thesis has been organized as follows. Chapter II is an introduction to Web 
robots and a look at the current landscape of several kinds of bots that crawl the Web 
today and the security issues they present. Additionally, Chapter II presents a high-level 
overview of common Web crawling programs. Chapter III reviews prior research on Web 
robot behavior and detection. Chapter IV introduces our methods for detecting Web 
crawlers and outlines the process we used for the training data set and live tests on the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) Dudley Knox Library website. Chapter V presents a 
detailed evaluation of the findings. Chapter VI summarizes the contributions of this thesis 
and proposes new avenues for future research.  
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II. WEB ROBOTS 
The use of scripts to automate the collection of data over the Internet is nearly as 
old as the Internet itself. Over the years there have been many different terms used to 
describe these automated programs. The earliest of these programs were known as 
spiders, and were developed solely for the purpose of indexing websites for search pages. 
Now spiders are typically called Web crawlers, and have evolved to include such 
programs such as Web scrapers for harvesting content, link checkers for verifying 
websites, or site analyzers for archiving Internet data.  
A Web robot, or simply a bot, is the term used to describe any type of program 
which automatically and recursively traverses websites. The most common kinds of Web 
robots on the Internet are the Web crawlers. Another type Web robot is a scanner, which 
is similar to a crawler, but designed to search specifically for a website’s vulnerabilities. 
The “good” Web robots that crawl the Web are an integral part of the Internet, 
and have played an important role in its evolution and growth. Conversely, the “bad” 
Web robots have been and continue to be a significant problem. Bad Web robots are 
widely used for launching denial of service (DDoS) attacks, to automating spam 
campaigns, for corporate espionage, and performing vulnerability scans of websites on a 
large scale.  
The landscape of the variety and number of Web robots on the Internet has 
changed in recent years. This chapter looks at the existing landscape of bot traffic on the 
Web and well as some contemporary examples of malicious Web robots.  
A. RISE OF THE BOTS 
This growing proportion of traffic that comes from Web robots presents a 
problem for the performance of Web servers. Researchers in 2013 [4] examined the Web 
logs of the university’s Web servers over a two-year period. The findings suggested that 
the resource requests of Web robot traffic were more likely to create cache problems on 
Web servers than those coming from human traffic. Web robots were more likely to 
request large resources than human beings did, and did not use local caches in Web 
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browsers. Web robot traffic also followed a different resource-popularity distribution 
than human traffic and thus negated the predictive cache algorithms of Web servers that 
were tuned to human requests. These findings were supported by Koehl et al. [8], who 
found that Web crawlers in their study represented “6.68% of all requests, but consumed 
31.76% of overall server processing time.” These studies suggest a need for more robust 
techniques and tools to identify and block unwanted Web robots from Web servers. 
Furthermore, if trends continue, the problem of “crawler overload” will continue hinder 
performance of Web servers.  
B. BAD ROBOTS 
The ability to detect and differentiate different Web robots is critical if we are 
indeed serious about protecting our application layer. There is limited research available 
on how bots are used maliciously and the ways in which administrators and legal entities 
can respond to them. Knowing the history and the diversity of Web robots is important if 
we are to protect Web servers against bot-related threats.  
1. Distributed Denial of Service Attack (DDoS)  
For years distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS) have been one of the 
biggest threats to network security. A DDoS attack is a coordinated attack on the 
availability of some type of network, usually occurring with the unknowing aid of a large 
set of compromised computers. In recent years, there has been an increasing threat in the 
kind of DDoS attacks that occur in the application layer or layer 7 using Web robots. 
According to a 2015 “State of the Internet Security” report by Akamai [9], the number of 
DDoS attacks had doubled in 2015 from the number of attacks in 2014. The percentage 
of these attacks that were conducted from the application layer was 9.32%.  
A 2014 study by Qin et al. [10] analyzed the attack behaviors of layer 7 DDoS 
attacks on websites and classified them into four different categories. They were: 
 The single URL—an attack that sends repeated requests to the target at 
fixed or random speeds. 
 The multiple URL—a repeated attack that sends a request to a fixed group 
of URLs in the attack vector. 
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 The random attack—sends requests to URLs randomly from the attack 
space of an already scanned website. 
 The session attack—those attacks in which the bots have been trained on 
the victim website and attempt to mimic a human’s normal browsing 
behavior. 
The same study tested whether using a model of human resource request traffic 
could be used to detect these four types of DDoS attack in simulation. The results were 
encouraging. However, the authors concluded that these post-mortem log analysis 
techniques would be ineffective in a real-word environment. Using post-mortem log 
analysis to preventing DDos attacks took too much time. It was proposed that future 
research investigate the reduction of “the span of time window” and to “consider real-
time detection” [10]. Real-time detection is a reoccurring theme for this area of security 
research. The ability of a Web server to identify and interrupt the active sessions by 
malicious Web robots is paramount to prevent a server-side exploit or DDoS attack from 
causing damage.  
2. Web Scanners 
Web scanners are another common form of Web robot. Scanners crawl selected 
websites or applications to look for known security vulnerabilities. A large number of 
commercial and open-source Web scanning tools are available on the market. Web 
scanners are used by white-hat (defensive) security engineers to test for common Web-
application vulnerabilities such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting, command 
execution, and directory traversal. Scanners are also employed by bad actors looking for 
opportunities for later intrusion attempts or exploitations. It can be difficult to detect Web 
scanners as they are often stealthy and usually only scan a few portions of a website at a 
time [11]. 
The traffic footprints of scanners are different from the traffic footprints of a 
typical search bot. The number of requests sent by Web scanners is small. Scanners tend 
to avoid requesting common files such as images or documents that do not pertain to the 
security profile of the target. Additionally, scanners tend to have more 404 request (page 
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not found) errors than traditional bots since they will probe for hidden resources of their 
target by guessing resource locations.  
In 2013, a website for the Department of Homeland Security was broken into by a 
hacktivist group using Web scanners that uncovered a vulnerability on the site. The 
hackers discovered that the website studyinthestates.dhs.gov contained a directory-
transversal vulnerability that allowed them access files that should have been 
inaccessible. The directory-transversal issue was a known problem with the site’s content 
management system, WordPress, and the version of PHP being used on the site’s Web 
server. A timely patching of the site’s content management software and its Web server 
could have easily prevented this [12]. 
In a 2014 study, Xie at al. [11] found that the use of Web scanners were 
widespread use on university websites. The researchers looked at university network 
traffic at the University of California Riverside and discovered that they were receiving 
an average of 4000 scans from unique IPs per week. The scanner traffic favored php, asp, 
and zip files along with common login and administrator filenames for well-known Web 
applications. As with the scans in the DHS breach, a significant portion of the scans on 
their websites were using probes which looked for common content management system 
vulnerabilities. 
3. Web Scrapers 
Web scrapers are similar to the Web crawlers except that scrapers are designed to 
mine the unstructured data from the Web in a way that can be stored and evaluated at a 
central database. This is accomplished through querying a Web server, requesting data in 
the form of Web pages and other resources, and parsing the data to extract needed 
information. Web scrapers employ a wide variety of programming techniques and 
technologies, including data analysis [13]. 
Web scraping has been a popular technique for startups and Internet researchers to 
gather data from the Internet. It is an inexpensive and powerful way to gather data from 
websites without the owner’s partnership or consent. Web scraping was largely left out of 
the courts until 2010 when the company eBay filed an injunction against the company 
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Bidders Edge, which had been scraping the eBay website to provide information to their 
own customers bidding on eBay’s website. The U.S. courts acknowledged that companies 
using “scrapers” or “robots” could be held liable for committing trespass to chattels [14]. 
Although the eBay case set a legal precedent in the United States, the practice of website 
scraping has remained largely unabated. In 2012, the startup called 3Taps used Web 
scrapers to pull ads from the website Craigslist. Craigslist later successfully sued on the 
grounds that 3Taps had violated the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act [15].  
Web scraping made the headlines more recently in 2015 when the financial news 
company Selerity posted Twitter’s earnings report (which missed the target) before the 
close of trading day and before it had been released by Twitter. Selerity’s Web scanner 
had discovered the link to the Twitter quarterly earnings announcement ahead of its 
official release by using a Web scanning algorithm to guess potential query strings for the 
news release. This publicized incident did result in a revision of the company’s “security 
by obscurity” method of handling press releases on the website [16].  
Web scraping can also be used maliciously by harvesting content from a victim’s 
site then publishing it under a new site with a new name. The demand for companies to 
protect their online assets from Web scrapers has produced several commercial anti-
scraping services (e.g., Distil Networks, ScrapeShield, BotDefender). These commercial 
services typically do not provide the technical details as to how their products defend 
against unwanted scraping.  
4. Web Crawlers 
Web crawlers are the automated programs used by search engines to explore the 
Internet and download data. While many of these programs are used by legitimate search 
engines, crawlers can be used to gather data for malicious purposes. Furthermore, 
legitimate crawlers have also been hijacked to be used for illegitimate purposes. In 2013, 
Daniel Cid discovered that his Web application was blocking requests from Google-
owned IP addresses [17]. He determined that the IP was being blocked because the 
address had appeared, from the firewall and other logs, to be attempting a SQL injection. 
A SQL injection is a commonly used technique for exploiting insecure Web applications. 
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Google Web crawlers were attempting SQL injections on his website using Google 
crawlers as a proxy. The hackers created Web pages with the SQL injections contained in 
the URL strings embedded on their Web pages. The Google crawlers followed the URLs 
on the hackers’ website to the victim site’s that was included with the SQL injection in 
the URL. This simple attack demonstrated how search engines can be susceptible to their 
“good” crawlers getting hijacked by bad actors [18]. 
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III. WEB ROBOT DETECTION 
The vast majority of the research in robot detection has relied on crawling 
artifacts such as fake user-agents, suspicious referrers, and bot-like traffic patterns. 
Researchers have looked into a variety of log analysis techniques for bot detection, 
including the use of machine learning algorithms to identify Web robots [19]. 
Stassopoulo et al. were the first to introduce probabilistic modeling methods for detecting 
Web robots using access logs. These researchers evaluated behaviors such as click rate, 
number of image requests, http error responses, and robots.txt requests to build their 
model [20].  
There is a significant drawback to detection methods that passively model Web 
traffic: they are unable detect Web robot sessions as they occur. However, there exists 
some detection techniques that operate in real time and do not depend on offline logs 
analysis. These techniques provide a test to the user while the session on the website is 
active, and analyzes the response to determine whether a human or a robot has produced 
it. Such programs are called Turing tests.  
A. TURING TESTS 
Research in distinguishing computers from humans started with Turing tests [20]. 
The early Turing tests asked if a human could distinguish between a human or machine 
by asking questions to both. In contrast, modern Turing tests use computer programs to 
perform a test that distinguishes between another computer program and a human.  
Turing tests are designed to be performed easily by humans and to be a challenge 
for computers. To detect Web robots, a Turing Test is given to a website’s visitor to 
determine whether the session has been generated by a robot or human. The most well-
known of these online tests are CAPTCHAs (Completely Automated Public Turing Tests 
to Tell Computer and Human Apart). CAPTCHA tests use a form of visual letter 
recognition to determine if a visitor is human or robot. Although they have long track 
record of success, in recent years the effectiveness of CAPTCHAs has waned to the 
growing sophistication of attackers using scanning tools to decode the images [13]. As a 
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result, CAPTCHA tests are being produced with more distorted images to make it more 
difficult for Web robots to interpret. Website administrators and designers however, are 
faced with a dilemma of whether to use the more difficult CAPTCHAs tests. If the tests 
are too difficult, there is a fear that users will get discouraged and may terminate the 
session [20]. 
While sophisticated Web robots can be programmed to exhibit human-like traffic 
patterns to avoid detection, these bots can still be detected using the automated Turing 
tests. A kind of Turing test that automatically distinguishes a Web robot from a human is 
called a Human Observational Proofs. HOPs are able to differentiate bots from humans 
by identifying bot behaviors that differ intrinsically from human’s behaviors. For 
example, a HOP can determine the whether a session is bot or human by looking at Web 
browser-based characteristic such as keystrokes and mouse movements.  
A 2006 study [21] introduced this technique using involved mouse movement and 
keyboard clicks to determine if the user was human. The experiment involved embedding 
a unique JavaScript into every new Web page requested and using an event handler to 
detect if any mouse or keyboard activity occurred within a session. If any mouse or 
keyboard activity was recognized the session was recorded as human. If there was no 
mouse or keyboard activity, it was recorded as a bot. It was found that this simple 
technique could reliably predict whether a human or robot started the session. To account 
for the fact that some people browse with JavaScript disabled on their browsers, the 
researchers embedded a second HOP test that involved hiding a resources in the html, 
like a honeypot. The results of the study showed that when using these combined 
techniques, human users could be detected at a 95% rate of accuracy were detected with a 
2.4% false positive rate.  
While this detection system proved reliable at the time, there are some inherent 
drawbacks to using this technique for detecting modern Web robots. Modern Web robots 
are able to emulate a browser interface and executing JavaScript and Cookies on a Web 
page. There are packages in Python such as PhantomJS capable of executing the 
JavaScript as the protagonist executes their Web bot code the website. It performs this 
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actions this by loading the website into memory and executes JavaScript on the page 
[13].  
Despite this known countermeasure, many Web applications today used this HOP 
technique for preventing bots from doing things such as submitting forms. A Web server 
using these types of controls will accept form submission only when a user’s mouse or 
keyboard event has been detected in the form submission process. Unfortunately, the 
authors of bots have successfully adapted to this security control. By creating automated 
bots which mimic these behaviors [22].  
Web robot developers have created an advanced form of bot which can open a 
Web page in a browser using Operating-system API calls to generate keyboard click and 
mouse movements. Researchers have studied these bots to determine if their mouse and 
keyboard patterns were predictable and differed from human mouse and keyboard 
behavior. They discovered that the bot behavior when simulating mouse and keyboard 
events were predictable, and could be employed to produce a detection rate of over 99% 
with limited processing overhead [22]. 
B. HONEYPOT 
A honeypot is a security mechanism designed to make it easier to detect someone or 
something that is using a system without authorization. Honeypots are a popular method 
for detecting unwanted visitors on websites. There are two kinds of honeypots: the active 
kind that attempts to “trap” unwanted traffic, and the passive kind, that is used solely for 
detection. A kind of popular trapping honeypot is a “spider trap” which tricks Web 
crawlers into infinite loops of page requests. A spider trap can be created in several ways, 
such as by adding links with infinitely deep directory trees, or by using dynamic pages with 
unbounded parameters. However, a drawback is that legitimate Web crawlers can be fooled 
by these traps as well. As a result, Web administrators which employ spider traps will often 
include their spider trap pages on the exclusion list of a robots.txt file [13].  
A popular kind of “passive” honeypot is hiding links and other resources within 
the Web page using formatting. A human which uses a browser to read a Web page 
cannot see links or other resources that have been hidden from view by the site’s design. 
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However, a Web crawler only looks at a page’s source code and will not likely check the 
formatting to see if a resource is hidden from view before requesting it. This technique 
can be applied to any element in a Web page.  
Honeypots are a useful tool for Web robot detection and prevention. It is possible 
for a website when honeypot is visited, to activate a server side script that blocks the 
visitor’s IP address, or logs out the visitor. This technique is currently being employed by 
commercial anti-scraping tools on the market. Although commercial anti-scrapping tools 
do not publish technical details on their detection techniques, it appears that these 
techniques are active component in their detection platforms. 
However, these honeypot defense techniques can be thwarted if Web robots are 
employing certain countermeasures. As discussed earlier, sophisticated Web robots can 
activate cookies, execute JavaScript code, and even emulate keyboard and mouse 
movements to avoid detection. In addition, Web robots can employ algorithms that search 
a Web page’s style sheet (CSS) for formats by which a resource can be hidden from 
view. If a Web robot finds a page element with a hidden field tag, it is able to exclude the 
resources with that style from its crawl [13].  
Currently there is little research that looks at the effectiveness of simple honeypot 
techniques for detecting both legitimate and illegitimate Web robots. There are legitimate 
reasons for a Web site designer to hide content within a Web page. Hidden fields can be 
used in Web forms to store default values which can be dynamically altered depending on 
the user’s actions. However, in the past, Web developers hid content in Web pages 
primarily to attract legitimate search engine crawlers to their site. The practice of hiding 
content within Web pages is used by Web developers to increase a Web page’s search 
engine optimization (SEO), or a higher page rank in search engines. Web page designers 
pack hidden content viewable only to Web crawlers in Web pages to inflate the page’s 
rankings in search results (keyword stuffing). Search engines have adapted to this 
practice by modifying crawling algorithms to detect this kind of keyword stuffing [23]. 
These hiding techniques involve tricks such as setting the size of a page layer to zero, 
indenting a page element so far as to appear off the screen, and hiding the keyword text 
by making it the same color as the background of the Web page.  
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IV. METHODOLOGY 
The objective for this experiment was to determine whether a honeypot placed in 
Web page can effectively detect and classify Web robot traffic. This chapter discusses the 
methodology of our experiment.  
A. MECHANISMS FOR HIDING CONTENT 
Content may be hidden for users with visual impairments. In our experiments, it 
was important that hidden honeypot resources be inaccessible to programs used by 
visually impaired users. Our assumption was that techniques for hiding content that were 
explicitly defined would be more likely to be ignored by screen readers than the ones 
which were not. In contrast, “constructed” formatting techniques such as hiding content 
through indentation or clipping are more likely be read by screen readers. We tested this 
hypothesis using the Apple Voice Over screen reading program. We ran the Apple Voice 
over program on a test page in CSS format with content hidden using six different CSS 
formatting methods for “hiding” layers. The results (see Table 1) showed that four of the 
five constructed CSS methods were accessible by our screen reader. Only two rules, the 
CSS rule with the height and width of zero, and the explicit CSS rule of display:none, 
were ignored by our screen reading test. As a result, we used the explicit display:none as 
a hiding method for our subsequent experiments. 
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Table 1.   Mechanisms for Hiding Content 
CSS Rules Display Effect Accessibility Effect 
 
display: none; 
Element is removed from the page flow 
and hidden; the space it occupied is 
collapsed 
 
Content ignored by screen readers 
height: 0;  
width:0; 
overflow: hidden; 
Element is collapsed and contents are 
hidden 
 
Content ignored by screen readers 
 
text-indent: -999em; 
Contents are shifted off-screen and hidden 
from view, but indentation might not 
completely hide content on some screens 
 
Screen readers accessed content, but only inline 
elements.  
 
position: absolute;  
left: 999em; 
 
Content is removed screen view to the left-
hand edge; 
 
Screen readers accessed content 
 
position:absolute;  
verflow: hidden;  
clip: rect(0 0 0 0); 
height: 1px; 
width:1px; margin: -
1px; padding: 0; 
border: 0; 
 
Content is clipped and collapsed and 
content in div does not affect overflow.  
 
Screen readers accessed content 
z:index: -1 Content is placed behind elements with 
greater index number. Hides element by 
visual obstruction within flow of page.  
Screen readers accessed content 
 
B. RESOURCE TYPES 
Research looking at Web traffic on college Web servers found that Web robots 
requested different resources than humans [4]. Bots had a higher preference for document 
files (xls, doc, pt, ps, pdf, dvi), Web-related files (html, hmt, asp, jsp, php, js, css), and 
noe (no extension) requests. A Web robot which requests a noe is attempting to access a 
directory or directories which is not directly linked from Web pages. As shown in Figure 
1, our experiment used the document and Web resources for our honeypot. 
Based upon our discussions with the information assurance staff at NPS, we 
decided to tailor the honeypot’s content for bot’s targeting email addresses, or “spam” 
bots. They were interested in knowing whether websites crawled by Web robots were 
looking specifically for email addresses, and .mil domains. 
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To test for this, we created files of the three most popular content types (pdf, doc, 
html) to be hidden in Web pages. A third of these files contained dummy military email 
addresses within the text, another third contained only regular email addresses, and 
another third contained no email addresses, only text (see Table 2).  
Table 2.   Test Contents Added to the Honeypot 



























Email – Military Emails 
04151795.pdf pdf Class 
noclass  
Email - Civilian Emails 
04151795.doc doc Class 
noclass  
Email - Civilian Emails 
112507.pdf doc class 
noclass 
Text only 
112507.doc  class 
noclass 
Text only 
Clfd.php php class Text only 
 
C. SANDTRAPS 
To show that honeypots can be used a part of a larger intrusion-detection or 
intrusion-prevention framework, we created a script to capture bot resource requests in 
real time. This script was called a sandtrap. Our initial foray used JavaScript placed into 
the two HTML honeypot resources to record the time, IP Address, and User Agent string 
of each requestor of the HTML file. In the initial testing, the scripts did record human 
requests but not crawlers. Unfortunately, most Web crawlers and Web scrapers in our test 
did not execute JavaScript when crawling. Therefore, we shifted the efforts towards 
implementing a server-side PHP script to catch crawlers because the NPS site was 
developed in PHP. Our PHP code (Appendix A) logged the time, IP Address, and User 
Agent strings of the visitor and printed the results into text tiles on the Web server. One 
file listed the IP addresses as a proposed blacklist for an IDS. A second file included data 
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from all three fields (see Appendix B). The information collected by the PHP sandtrap 
provided a quick reference point for identifying individual robot sessions in the post-
mortem log analysis, and the file in which the script was placed, clfd.php provided 
information about the resource type of PHP for our analysis of the bot traffic.  
D. ROBOT EXCLUSION PROTOCOL 
Many websites have terms-of-service agreements that explicitly forbid 
unauthorized scraping or crawling of the website without the permission of its owner. 
Unfortunately, such terms of service are often ignored by Web robots. Also, the Robots 
Exclusion Protocol can request that a Web robot not crawl certain areas of a site by 
specifying restricted areas in a robots.txt file [24]. Unfortunately, not all bots cooperate 
with this voluntary standard, and malicious bots may prefer to target the restricted areas 
of websites [23]. However, generally Web crawlers used for legitimate purposes check a 
site’s robots.txt before crawling it and abide by the site’s exclusion policy [4]. 
For this reason, we employed a “one-strike” rule to classify bots which accessed 
the honeypots. If a bot failed to check our site’s robots.txt file or failed to comply with its 
directives, it was classified as a “bad” bot. If a bot accessed the honeypot, checked the 
robox.txt file, and followed the directives, it was classified as a “good” bot. A test 
directive used in the robots.txt file restricted robots from crawling anything the “class” 
folder:  
User-agent:* 
Disallow: themes/…/…/…/class/  
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Figure 1 represents the logic of our classification process in our analysis of bots 
that accessed our honeypot.  
 
 
Figure 1.  Process of Bot Classification 
E. FOCUSED CRAWLING 
Focused crawling is a type of crawling that looks at Web page context and link 
structure of a crawled link before assigning it a download priority. The download priority 
is based on the likelihood the Web page will lead to the topic being queried by the 
crawler, so the links with higher download priority are downloaded first. The basic 
workflow [23] of this process is diagrammed in Figure 2. There a variety of methods used 
for assigning priority. One common method is to use the similarity of the query to the 
anchor text of the page link [25]. Anchor text is the text in a hyperlink that is viewable 
and clickable. For our test, we wanted our honeypot to attract Web bots looking for email 
so we fashioned the anchor text in the links to include the kinds of email addresses listed 
in the documents and pages (John.doe@navy.mil, jane.doe@gmail.com). Our assumption 
was that if crawlers focused on harvesting email addresses visited the NPS library page, 
they would assign our honeypot links a higher priority.  
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Figure 2.  Focused Crawler Workflow 
F. BASELINE TEST 
We ran a preliminary test using six popular Web crawling and scraping programs. 
To create the honeypot, we replicated the NPS library homepage “libsearch” on an 
external Web server. To make a Web architecture and template structure consistent with 
the library’s website, we installed the VuFind open source library portal program on the 
test server. VuFind is the portal NPS uses for the libsearch.nps.edu website. We then 
copied the site’s homepage template so the test page would resemble the real site (see 
Appendix C). 
The links to the honeypot resource were placed into two different hidden div 
layers within the header template on the test site’s index.php. One div layer contained 
links to the honeypot resources in the restricted area (the “class” folder). The other div 
layer contained the links to honeypot resources in a non-restricted area (a “noclass” 
folder). Appendix D show this inline HTML code which was placed into the header 
template of the website.  
Six crawling programs were selected based upon their popularity and rankings in 
industry-related blogs. Four of the programs (Import.io, iRobotSoft, 80Legs, and 
ScrapeBox) were commercial point-and-click tools. The other two were Web scraping 
frameworks written in the Python and Ruby programming languages.  
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Import.io is a free Web data extraction service that allows users to extract Web 
content as they browse Web pages and click on elements in the page. The Import.io 
program has user-friendly interface that is not conducive to large-scale data extraction 
since each page must be manually visited before being crawled. It comes with an 
automatic link-extraction tool. In our test, the link extractor script revealed our “hidden” 
honey html and php links, but not the doc or pdf files. We were able to visit the only the 
hidden html links and harvest the emails on the html files manually. In a review of the 
Web server access logs, the Import.io service did not identify itself in the user-agent 
field. Nor did the Import.io crawling program check robot.txt nor prevent users from 
extracting data from restricted areas. However, the robot-exclusion protocol may be 
correctly ignored due to the fact the user has to visit to the restricted area before a crawler 
scrapes its data.  
80legs is a commercial Web-crawling service provided by the data-mining 
company Datafiniti. The service provides an online administration portal to users with a 
list of standard scraping scripts including an email harvester. We ran 80leg’s email 
scraping script our test site. It returned only the email addresses from the .html files from 
the unrestricted area. The 8legs crawler checked the robots.txt file and identified itself in 
the user-agent field. 
Scraperbox is a commercial Web crawling program that identifies itself as “The 
Swiss Army Knife of SEO.” It is a GUI tool designed for increasing Web page search 
engine optimization (SEO) with a built-in email-scraping tool. It was able to harvest all 
of the hidden honeypot email addresses except the pdf files. It does not check the 
robots.txt file and does not identify itself in the user-agent field. 
Scrapy is an open-source Web scraping framework written in Python. We created 
a Web scraper using it and the BeautifulSoup screen scraping library for Python. We ran 








We employed the PDFMiner3K for parsing the PDF files the scraper was able to collect. 
Our program did not check the robots.txt file and used a spurious user-agent. 
Selenium is a tool that automates Web browsers and was originally developed for 
website testing [13]. It is a powerful Web scraping tool which it can exercise all of the 
browser functionality. We used the Selenium is displayed() function with our 
Python crawler and the Firefox browser to exclude all of the fields from our search 
which were hidden from view. The result returned no emails from our hidden honeypot 
resources.  
Anenome is an open-source Web crawling framework written in the Ruby 
programming language. Modifying an existing Anenome crawling templates, or “gem,” 
we were able to harvest emails using the same regular expressions from our Python 
scraper. The anemone crawler was able to collect every email but the ones in the pdf 
files. 
G. SUMMARY  
Our baseline test demonstrated that all but one of our Web crawlers fetched some 
of our honeypot resources in their crawls (see Table 3). The Selenium crawler was 
specifically designed to avoid page elements that were hidden from view and it was able 
to avoid our honeypot in its crawl. Since Selenium has to execute with an active browser 
running, it was unclear to whether this crawler could be run efficiently in a large-scale 
data-mining campaign. Additionally, our results showed the commercial and open-source 
crawlers we tested which were not commercial services did not check robots.txt and limit 
crawls from restricted areas. All but one of the crawlers were unable to parse pdf file 
types and half of the crawlers we tested could not parse doc file types. 
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Analysis of the access logs indicated that the anchor texts did not encourage our 
crawlers to download one type of file more frequently than another. We customized 
crawls to searches for email addresses with either .mil or .com. extensions, but found 
there were no differences in the resources fetched. However, these results were not 
unexpected because we did not see any evidence that any that the tool we tested 
employed focused search method in their crawling algorithms. 









ed pdf doc .html pdf doc  .html 
Import.io No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
80Legs Yes No No Yes No No No 
Scrapy  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Selenium  No No No No No No No 
ScrapeBox No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
iRobotSoft No No No Yes No No Yes 
Anenome No No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
 
H. LIBSEARCH TEST 
We embedded the two hidden div layers in the header template of every webpage 
on the NPS library’s libsearch.nps.edu website. This allowed for the honeypot to be 
accessible from any point within the website. The honeypots were placed within the 
VuFind application directory that included the interface for the website. The NPS 
Library’s site did not have a robots.txt file, so we added ours to the website’s root 
director. The file included only one directive, which was to restrict crawling of all files 




The “deep Web” refers to parts of the Web that are not indexed by search engines. 
The deep Web includes a variety of Web content that is inaccessible to crawling. For 
example, many shopping and banking website provide structured content which is only 
accessible through a search interfaces or by logging into the website. These types of Web 
content are typically more difficult for Web robots to crawl and index. The 
libsearch.nps.edu website has some characteristics of a deep-Web site, and is structured 
to display majority of its content through its search interface. For a Web robot to access 
this content, it must be able to generate queries to the website’s search form in its 
requests. The honeypot resources we placed within the website could not detect a Web 
robot’s querying of the site’s search forms. However, by placing the honeypot resources 
within the header portion of the site’s template, we ensured it was accessible from the 





A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
Web logs from the NPS libsearch.nps.edu Web server from a five-week period 
provided the data for our analysis. Our sandtrap logs provided supporting data as well. 
The data considered for our log analysis were HTTP transactions. HTTP transactions are 
the requests made by clients, and the corresponding responses from the Web server. 
These requests are recorded to the Web server’s logs, which, for our experiment were 
Apache’s access logs.  
During the test period, there were 930,701 HTTP requests, and with an average of 
27,373 requests per day. We processed the Web logs to extract the Web robot traffic 
using the Splunk [24] data analysis program. We applied a syntactic analysis of the 
“User-Agent” field of the HTTP headers with Splunk’s built-in keyword list for denoting 
bots. Since a user agent string can be easily forged, this process only could identify the 
self-identifying bots. It does not detect stealth bots that use forged user-agent fields of 
Web browsers. Table 4 summarizes the aggregate statistics of the percentage of HTTP 
request of humans and Web robots. Robot traffic on represented 64% of all of the 
requests on the Libsearch Web server in our study and 18% of the bandwidth consumed.  
There were 46 different self-identifying bots which visited the website during this 
period from a total of 505 different IP addresses. The three major search engines, Bing, 
Yahoo and Google accounted for of 99% of the search requests (see Appendix E). 
Approximately 67% of the bot traffic requests consisted of search queries to the /vufind 
/Search/Results? page.  
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Table 4.   Summary of Libsearch Web Logs 
 Human Traffic Robot Traffic 
Total Requests 334,673 596,028 
Average Req/Day 9843 17530 
Bandwidth Consumed (GB) 179.74269 39.4557 
% of Distinct Requests 35.955 (36%) 64.040 (64%) 
 
1. Honeypot Results  
During our testing period, there were 358 requests for honeypot files on the 
nps.libsearch.edu Web server. Of the requested files, 216 of them were for contents 
within the unrestricted noclass folder, and 142 requests were for content within the 
restricted class folder. The resource request distribution of the class and the noclass files 
are represented in Figures 3 and 4.  
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Figure 3.  Distribution of Honeypot Requests: Unrestricted Files. 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of Honeypot Requests: Restricted Files 
Web robots in our experiment had a higher preference for document resource 
types (.doc, .html) files than Web resource type (php, html). This contrasted with the 
findings of Doran [4] which found that Web robots as had a preference for Web resources 
types over document resource types. There was no significant difference in the number of 
requests for resources containing civilian email addresses versus resources containing 
military emails addresses.  
In the unrestricted noclass folder we observed 21 Web robot campaigns from 59 
IP addresses accounting for the 216 HTTP resources requests. A DNS lookup of these IP 
addresses revealed that 11 of these bots, or 52%, used forged user agent strings (see 
Appendix E). Ten of the 11 forged user agent string represented Web Browsers and one 
represented a Google Web robot. Of the 10 self-identified bots, all of them checked the 
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robots.txt file. Of the 11 bots that used forged user agents, only two had checked the 
robots.txt file.  
For the restricted class folder, we observed 16 Web robot campaigns from 25 
unique IP addresses accounting for 142 HTTP resource request. All 25 of the IP 
addresses were also in the unrestricted IP list. Seven of the campaigns were self-
identified as bots, and a DNS lookup reveal 6 to be accurate with one forged Google bot. 
The remaining 7 IP addresses used forged user agent fields representing various Web 
browsers. Only seven of the 16 bots that accessed resources the class folder checked the 
robots.txt file. Of the 12 self-identifying bots, only of them, Yandex, came from a well-
known search engine. During the experiment, Yandex bots made 548 requests from 13 
different IP addresses to the Web server. In total, Yandex accounted for 0.09%, of the 
total bot traffic on the website. It is unclear why the Russian search engine did not follow 
the site exclusion protocol. By our classification scheme in Chapter IV, all 25 of these 
bots of classify as “bad” by not following the site’s exclusion protocol.  
2. Project Honeypot 
We used the http:BL service from the Project Honeypot organization to verify our 
results from our honeypot test. The Project Honeypot maintains a list of IP addresses of 
malicious bots that are known to harvest email addresses for spam and other purposes 
[25]. We checked our list of IP addresses which visited the site during the period of the 
experiment against the Project Honeypot’s list of known malicious bots.  
The results of the http:BL lookup produced 40 IPs from the Project Honeypot’s 
blacklist, which accounted for a total of 444 requests on the library’s Web server. We 
compared to our list of 84 IP addresses of bots that requested honeypot resources. We 
found no matches between our bot list and the Project Honeypot list.  
B. ANALYSIS 
The results from the honeypot experiment did not produce a confirmation for our 
hypothesis. The hidden resources in the Web interface did not turn out to be particularly 
effective in attracting and detecting Web robots on the library’s website. Our training test 
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had provided evidence that honeypots could be valuable for detecting commercial and 
open source Web crawling programs designed for harvesting emails. In addition, our use 
of context-specific anchor text in the links seemed to have potential for attracting bots 
designed to harvest emails with certain domain extensions. However, due to the small 
sample size in our experiment, we were unable to determine if there was correlation 
between the honeypot content and the number of requests.  
Furthermore, the architecture and content of the website may not have been well 
suited for honeypot that we used. As we learned through our log analysis, the majority 
(67%) of bot traffic on the libsearch.nps.edu website consisted of queries into the site’s 
catalogues. In hindsight, if would have been beneficial if we had performed an 
exploratory analysis of the target before determining the location and content of the 
honeypots. Placing honeypots of the form of spurious query forms would have likely 
increased the attractiveness of our honeypots.  
C. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
This investigation presented in this thesis focused on the detection of Web robots 
with honeypots. There is a strong impetus for understanding how honeypots can help 
detect Web robots, as current methods for real-time detection of Web robots are limited 
at best. Looking at the data collected from our experiment, it was evident that an 
exploratory analysis of the Web robot traffic of our test website would have helped to 
better inform the design of our honeypot. A significant portion of the Web robot requests 
were queries for deep Web content through the website’s search interface. A honeypot 
using a hidden search form to attract bots might have improved our results. By contrast, 
our training test showed that honeypots could be an effective tool for detecting crawling, 
provided the honeypot resource matches the focus of the crawl.  
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APPENDIX A. PHP CODE FOR THE SANDTRAP 
<?php 
define( “BBOT_ENABLE_LOGGING,” true ); 
define( “BBOT_LOG_FILE,” dirname( __FILE__ ) . “/bot_log.txt” ); 
define( “BBOT_BOTLIST,” dirname( __FILE__ ) . “/bot_list.txt” ); 
 
function check_ip() { 
$botlist = file(BBOT_BOTLIST, FILE_IGNORE_NEW_LINES| 
FILE_SKIP_EMPTY_LINES ) ); 






function get_ip() { // Put the IP address into the bot_list file 
$bfh = fopen( BBOT_BOTLIST, “at” ); 
fwrite( $bfh, $_SERVER[‘REMOTE_ADDR’] . “\n” ); 
fclose( $bfh ); 
log_ip(); 
  halt(); 
} 
 
function log_ip() { 
if ( BBOT_ENABLE_LOGGING ) { // Put the User Agent, IP address, into bot_log file 
$logfh = fopen( BBOT_LOG_FILE, “at” ); 
fwrite( $logfh, 
date(“Y-m-d H:i:s T”) . “;” . 
$_SERVER[‘REMOTE_ADDR’] . “;” . 
$_SERVER[‘HTTP_USER_AGENT’] .”\n” 
); 
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APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE SANDTRAP OUTPUT 
 
Figure 5.  Complete Bot Log 
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APPENDIX E. BOT CAMPAIGNS 
Table 5.   Self-Identified Crawler Campaigns—Total 
Web Robot  Requests Percent IPs 
Bingbot 494911 70.419892 197 
Yahoo! Slurp;  111459 15.859277 10 
Googlebot/2.1;  92658 13.184121 29 
Baiduspider/2.0;  1445 0.205606 121 
Googlebot/2.1; -iPhone 659 0.093768 8 
YandexBot/3.0; 548 0.077974 13 
MJ12bot 487 0.069294 19 
DuckDuckGo 204 0.029027 1 
Applebot/0.3 55 0.007826 2 
bingbot/2.0 - iPhone 38 0.005407 23 
Googlebot-Image/1.0 36 0.005122 4 
YandexImages/3.0 32 0.004553 9 
Google Web Preview Analytics 31 0.004411 1 
Exabot/3.0 20 0.002846 1 
Googlebot (gocrawl v0.4) 19 0.002703 19 
WBSearchBot 16 0.002277 1 
 ZumBot/1.0; http://help.zum.com/inquiry) 14 0.001992 1 
Applebot/0.1;  12 0.001707 1 
Findxbot/1.0; 12 0.001707 1 
SputnikBot 10 0.001423 5 
Cliqzbot/1.0 10 0.001423 4 
bingbot/2.0; 8 0.001138 3 
Mail.RU_Bot 7 0.000996 5 
yacybot  6 0.000854 2 
Speedy Spider 6 0.000854 1 
MS Search 6.0 Robot 5 0.000711 1 
 SeznamBot/3.2;  4 0.000569 2 
SemrushBot/1~bl;  4 0.000569 2 
AhrefsBot/5.0;  4 0.000569 2 
Domain Re-Animator Bot  4 0.000569 1 
CSS Certificate Spider 4 0.000569 1 
bhcBot 4 0.000569 1 
archiver/3.1.1  3 0.000427 1 
Applebot/0.1 -iPhone 2 0.000285 1 
 linkdexbot/2.2; 2 0.000285 1 
 BLEXBot/1.0;  2 0.000285 1 
 40
Web Robot  Requests Percent IPs 
archive.org_bot 2 0.000285 1 
Googlebot/2.1 2 0.000285 2 
Crawler@alexa.com 2 0.000285 1 
 ZumBot/1.0; 1 0.000142 1 
SurdotlyBot/1.0; 1 0.000142 1 
SputnikImageBot/2.3 1 0.000142 1 
PrivacyAwareBot/1.1;  1 0.000142 1 
 ParsijooBot;  1 0.000142 1 
linkapediabot 1 0.000142 1 
Table 6.   Bots Accessing Unrestricted “noclass” Folder 
DNS Lookup Bot/User-Agent IP Requests 
msnbot-157-55-39-162.search.msn.com* bingbot/2.0;  26 38 
crawl-66-249-79-223.googlebot.com Googlebot/2.1 1 14 
static.69.131.9.176.clients.your-server.de MJ12bot/v1.4.5; 2 6 
5e.c2.7e4b.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com  ScoutJet; 1 1 
loft1165.serverloft.com WBSearchBot 1 2 
b115340.yse.yahoo.net  Yahoo! Slurp; 1 16 
spider-141-8-143-157.yandex.com*  YandexBot/3.0; 3 86 
no results ZumBot/1.0; 1 3 
crawl-66-249-79-223.googlebot.com  Googlebot/2.1 - iPhone 3 9 





Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; U; Intel Mac OS X 
10.6; en-US; rv:1.9.2.13; ) Gecko/20101203 
1 1 
static.151.80.76.144.clients.your-server.de Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:24.0) 
Firefox/24.0 PaleMoon/24.0.2 
1 2 
no results Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; WOW64; 




Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 6.1; 
rv:2.2) Gecko/20110201 
1 2 
crawl15.lp.007ac9.net Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) 
AppleWebKit/534.30 (KHTML, like Gecko)… 
1 2 
107-172-229-131-host.colocrossing.com Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) 
AppleWebKit/537.36  
1 5 
accomodationhub.com Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) 
AppleWebKit/537.36  
2 3 
technology-approval.com Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) 
AppleWebKit/537.36  
1 2 
crawl20.lp.007ac9.net Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i586; de; rv:5.0) 
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/5.0 
1 2 
172-245-169-14-host.colocrossing.com Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; 




voltron 7 7 
 Totals 59 216 
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Table 7.   Bots Accessing Restricted Folder 
DNS Lookup Agent  IP Requests  
spider-100-43-85-
10.yandex.com 
Mozilla/5.0 YandexBot/3.0;  2 2  
technology-
approval.com 
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/47.0.2526.111 Safari/537.36 
1 2  
accomodationhub.com Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/47.0.2526.111 Safari/537.36 
2 3  
107-172-227-218-
host.colocrossing.com 
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/47.0.2526.111 Safari/537.36 
3 5  
spider-141-8-143-
157.yandex.com 
YandexBot/3.0 2 62  
static.151.80.76.144.cl
ients.your-server.de 
Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 5.1; rv:24.0) Gecko/20130925 
Firefox/24.0 PaleMoon/24.0.2 
1 3  
172-245-169-48-
host.colocrossing.com 
Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/42.0.2311.135 Safari/537.36 
1 1  
static.69.131.9.176.cli
ents.your-server.de 
Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; MJ12bot/v1.4.5; 
http://www.majestic12.co.uk/bot.php?+) 
1 6  
crawl20.lp.007ac9.net Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i586; de; rv:5.0) Gecko/20100101 
Firefox/5.0 








Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.8.1.12) 
Gecko/20080219 Firefox/2.0.0.12 Navigator/9.0.0.6 
1 3  
no result Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:44.0) 
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/44.0 
1 2  
no results Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; rv:38.0) Gecko/20100101 
Firefox/38.0illa/5.0 (compatible; Googlebot/2.1; 
+http://www.google.com/bot.html) 
3 20  
5e.c2.7e4b.ip4.static.sl
-reverse.com 
ScoutJet;  1 1  
loft1165.serverloft.co
m 
WBSearchBot/1.1; +http://www.wareBay.com/bot.html) 1 5  
crawl15.lp.007ac9.net Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux i686) AppleWebKit/534.30 
(KHTML, like Gecko) Ubuntu/10.04 
Chromium/12.0.742.112 Chrome/12.0.742.112 Safari/534.30 
1 3  
 Totals 25 142  
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